First, a major strategic defeat in Ukraine, after a stunning counter-offensive dealt a blow to the Kremlin’s ambitions in the east. Then, what was supposed to be a gathering of like-minded leaders in Uzbekistan mostly served to remind him of his weakened position as the Russian President was blocked by China and then criticized by India. Meanwhile, in a neighborhood where Moscow is supposed to be the guarantor of security, there has been fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan and border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan continue. Putin is also under pressure at home, with criticism from surprising quarters. On Sunday, Alla Pugacheva, a much-loved pop singer who has been a household name for Russians for decades, posted a message criticizing the “deceptive targets” in Ukraine that have made Russia a “pariah” that weighs “heavily on the lives of its citizens.” On the other hand, nationalists are furious with the incompetent military leadership, prompting Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov to warn that criticism would be fine – until it wasn’t: “The line is extremely thin. One has to be very careful here”. However, the reality of a collapse campaign is hard to avoid, and calls for national mobilization to address all of these concerns are becoming too loud to ignore. Putin said last week that there was “no rush” in Ukraine – his case remains clear that the Russian regime can overcome Western resolve – and there would be no changes to the plan. But he pointed out that Russia was “not fighting with a full army.” For many, given the expansive goals at stake, this is the problem. They argue that Putin cannot win with his current strategy. National mobilization will add resources and manpower, expanding the pool of fighters. But that’s theory. In practice, calling a spade a spade is unthinkable for the Kremlin, which still lacks a clearly articulated plan for Ukraine and has spent months separating ordinary Russians from reality on the front lines. Worst of all, it may already be too late, anyway. For now, it’s certainly an unusually loud public debate. In a rare outburst, former MP Boris Nadezhdin argued during a TV show that it would be impossible to “defeat Ukraine with these resources, with this method of ‘colonial warfare’, with contract soldiers, mercenaries and without general mobilization ». He added: “Either we mobilize and go to full-scale war or we get out.” He proposed peace talks. other participants called him down. Days later, Gennady Zyuganov, the head of Russia’s Communist Party and a voice of the Kremlin-tolerated opposition, sought “maximum mobilization” and became the highest-profile figure to call the attack a war. “A war is something you cannot stop even if you want to,” he told the Duma last week. “You have to fight until the end.” For Zyuganov, security hawks or figures like Ramzan Kadyrov, the pro-regime leader of the southern region of Chechnya, whose militia is fighting in Ukraine, the benefit of the mobilization is to add manpower and move the economy on a war footing. focusing precisely on military production. But it is a choice that Putin, who relies on an illusion of stability and normality, is reluctant to make. Three reasons come to mind. Obviously, that would be an admission of failure. A special military operation that, seven months later, becomes a war, is difficult to portray as a success. Second, mobilization requires undoing the passivity on which Putin has built his regime. It involves mobilizing citizens who have been largely emboldened to bypass a war that was supposed to be surgical and quick. This was an offensive that – unlike, say, the disastrous Soviet decade in Afghanistan – was supposed to be fought by paid volunteers, recruited from the country’s poorer (and often ethnically non-Russian) provinces, places like Tuva or Dagestan . Ordinary people in the larger cities could support a war that required nothing of them. As Yuval Weber of Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service in Washington put it to me, these masses in the middle pose the real danger to the Kremlin, much more so than the nationalist right. They are the ones the regime has long relied on, men and women who have been lulled into apathy but now should be whipped into a frenzy. By getting more involved (and sending their own relatives to war), they may well start asking awkward questions about Putin’s effectiveness. Then there is the third problem – mass mobilization will be a huge challenge. Logistics are complex. The economy will not easily bear the cost of losing workers, resistance to the missile is escalating and will continue to rise as soldiers return from the front. Not to mention that they need men now — but getting recruits through training will take months, given that Russia lacks a strong, well-trained reserve force. Nor is it clear how reservists and new conscripts, who officially escape the front lines, can solve fundamental problems of leadership, morale, and materiel. And yet Russia cannot be stuck fighting an existential war it has waged with very few men, losing them and their weapons at an astonishing rate – US officials last month put the number of dead or wounded since the start of the war at as high as 80,000 , although the numbers vary widely. There is still the risk that Russia could escalate or use a perceived growing threat to push for a declaration of war. As Ben Noble of University College London points out, growing talk in the Kremlin of unprecedented NATO support for Ukraine may well create options for a regime that sees very few. The West, officials might eventually argue, forced Moscow’s hand. But for now the Kremlin is betting on the next best thing – encouraging regions and mercenaries to mobilize on behalf of the state, ignoring already deep problems of coordination between the warring units. Footage emerged last week of a man who bore a striking resemblance to sanctioned businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin addressing inmates in a prison on behalf of the Wagner mercenary group, promising to commute sentences for the service. “If you serve six months (in Wagner), you’re free,” he says. “If you get to Ukraine and decide it’s not for you, we’ll execute you.” Even more telling, however, was Prigozhin’s response on social media after the video went viral: “It’s either private military companies and prisoners, or your children,” he wrote. “Decide for yourself.” More from other Bloomberg Opinion writers: • Putin and the possibility of defeat: Leonid Bershidsky • Putin finds the limit of Xi’s unlimited friendship: Clara Ferreira Marques • Punishing the Russians will not end the war in Ukraine: Ian Buruma This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners. Clara Ferreira Marques is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and editorial board member covering foreign affairs and climate. Previously, he worked for Reuters in Hong Kong, Singapore, India, the United Kingdom, Italy and Russia. More stories like this are available at bloomberg.com/opinion
